Major Fire Incidents Case Studies

The UK has witnessed many deadly and catastrophic major fire incidents in its history. Probably one of the most famous is the Great Fire of London in 1666. It destroyed much of the medieval City of London, including 87 churches, around 13,200 houses, 44 livery halls, and several key landmarks such as St. Paul’s Cathedral. The fire left about 70,000 of the city’s 80,000 residents homeless. The costs were estimated at over £10 million (estimated £1.7 billion in today’s money).

The enormous losses suffered after the Great Fire of London led to the establishment of fire insurance, where people paid a fee to an insurance company to insure their property against damage. Metal plaques with the brightly painted emblems of each fire insurance company were placed high up on the buildings of insured properties. Before the Great Fire of London there were no fire brigades, so to protect the properties of their customers and to reduce their own losses most London insurance companies employed up to 30 Thames Watermen to put out fires.

Other lessons learned from this devastating major fire incident included key changes in building codes, including the banning of wooden structures in central London and the creation of wider streets to prevent future fires from spreading so quickly.

Fast forward some 300+ years, and although we are still experiencing major fire incidents, they are nothing on the scale of the Great Fire of London, as the lesson learnt acted as a catalyst for significant changes to building design and standards in the city.

In the UK, fire incidents are broadly categorised as primary, secondary or chimney fires, depending on the location, severity and risk levels of the fire, and on the scale of response needed from Fire and Rescue Services to contain them. In the year ending June 2024, Fire and Rescue Services responded to 594,384 incidents.

A major incident is defined as one that is likely to involve serious harm, damage or disruption and pose a risk to human life. Over the past decade, the number of primary fires has declined from 71,786 in the year ending June 2014 to 60,846 in the latest year, the lowest recorded since comparable data became available. Debriefs and lessons learned following incidents may have contributed to this fall in numbers.

The investigation of the cause and reports on the response to the incident are critical for ensuring a repeat of the event does not occur in the future, and that improvements can be made to the efficacy of the strategies, and tactical and operational activities at the event. Such lessons should be completed and made available in a timely manner so that the lessons learned can be acted upon to try to prevent a repetition. In this article we will examine four renowned major fire incidents to draw lessons that can help prevent similar tragedies in the future.

Major Fire Incidents and Their Impact

Grenfell Tower Fire (UK, 2017)

Grenfell Tower, a 1970’s high-rise apartment block in West London, was engulfed in flames in June 2017. Just before 1:00 am on 14^th June, fire broke out in the kitchen of a fourth floor flat at the 23-storey tower block in North Kensington. Within minutes, the fire had raced up the exterior of the building and then spread to all four sides.

The fire brigade were called, and the call was logged at 12:54 am. Four fire engines were sent to the scene, the first arriving at 12:59 am and the first fire crew entered the flat at 1:07 am. Thermal images captured by the fire crew appear to show that hot fire gases and flames had spread across the window space. As the fire crew dealt with the fire in the fridge-freezer, their thermal images appeared to show falling embers outside the kitchen window and it appears that the fire had spread to the cladding. By 3:00 am, most of the upper floors of Grenfell Tower were engulfed in flames.

At 2:06 am, the London Fire Brigade declared the fire a major incident, and at this point, around 40 fire engines were either at or en route to the scene.

Grenfell Tower had undergone renovations that included the addition of external cladding. This consisted of aluminium sheets bonded to a central plastic (polyethylene) core. In the 1980s, the use of cladding was widespread in the construction industry. However, fires in the 1990s and early 2000s in high-rise flats at, for example, Knowsley Heights in Liverpool, Garnock Court in North Ayrshire, Scotland and Lakanal House in Camberwell, South London had already highlighted the risks and dangers of these cladding materials, reporting the cladding acting as an effective conductor for the blaze. Between 2012 and 2017, the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) received numerous warnings about the risks involved in using polymeric insulation and aluminium composite panels with unmodified polyethylene cores. However, despite what they knew, and the warnings they received, when Grenfell Tower was renovated in 2016, these materials were used in the renovation.

Grenfell Tower had a ‘stay put’ fire policy, meaning that residents were advised to close their windows and doors and to stay in their flats, and essentially the building design would contain a fire in a single flat for as long as it would take fire crews to bring it under control. As the fire raged out of control and thick poisonous smoke spread up the single narrow stairwell, many residents became trapped. Seventy-two people died in the Grenfell Tower fire, more than 70 people were injured, and 223 people escaped the fire. A total of 65 people were rescued from the building by firefighters. Of those who died, 29 were women, 25 were men, and 18 were children, including an unborn baby. The oldest victim was 84 years old, and the youngest was six months old. Four of the victims did not live in Grenfell Tower.

Key Lessons

The first report into what happened at Grenfell Tower on the night itself, published in 2019, identified a litany of failures, including that the ‘principal reason’ the flames shot up the building at such speed was the combustible cladding which acted as a ‘source of fuel’ and actively helped spread the blaze.

Since the fire at Grenfell Tower, there has never been a greater focus on the use of fire-resistant materials in the UK construction market, including the establishment of a Construction Products Regulator (CPR). Many risks with fire-resistant materials involve cladding, but the problems go beyond that with incorrect compartmentation, incorrectly fitted cavity barriers, lack of fire alarms and inadequate fire protection in the building frames.

Safety measures using fire-resistant building materials that should be taken include but are not limited to:

• Fire-resistant glass – this is designed to endure extreme temperatures while maintaining its structural integrity during a fire.
• Fire doors – these are a crucial part of any building’s compartmentation strategy. When reinforcing them with either intumescent strips or a cold smoke seal, valuable minutes are added to fire resistance. The range of doors typically provides an additional fire-resistant time of between 30 minutes to 1 hour although longer is possible.
• Insulated walls – this can provide excellent fire suppression, and can be battens, a blanket of mineral wool, fibreglass or stone wool insulation to achieve greater passive fire protection.
• Drywalls – with low thermal conductivity and enhanced fire protection, fire-resistant plasterboard can be applied to walls, partitions and ceilings.
• Spray applied fireproofing – also known as sprayed fire-resistive material (SFRM), this can be used as part of a building’s passive fireproofing strategy and can delay or prevent failure of steel and concrete structures exposed to high temperatures during a fire.
• Sprinklers and other Automatic Fire Suppression Systems (AFSS) – these can save lives, homes and businesses. They provide protection from fire damage and, most importantly, they give people a greater chance of getting out if there is a fire.
• Smoke alarms and heat alarms – smoke alarms detect smoke, but in smoky or steamy rooms such as the kitchen or bathroom, a heat alarm is more suitable.

The time taken for the London Fire Brigade to revoke the ‘stay put’ advice has been highlighted as a contributing factor to the number of casualties caused by the incident in the inquiry reports on the Grenfell fire. Firefighters and 999 operators told residents to stay in their flats for nearly two hours after the blaze broke out.

The theory behind the ‘stay put’ strategy is that any fire from within a single dwelling is assumed to be confined to that dwelling and to not be able to spread because each dwelling should be surrounded by its own one-hour fire compartment. The fire brigade will attend well within this time and proceed to extinguish the fire, irrespective of where the premises are or where in the premises the fire is. In addition, all of the escape routes/corridors are expected to be similarly protected and the fire escape staircase should be similarly separated from the corridors via fire lobbies which also have a one-hour fire-resisting structure. Unfortunately in the Grenfell Tower, none of the flats’ doors met current fire-resistance standards.

The alternative to a ‘stay put’ policy is one involving simultaneous evacuation where all, or a number of, residents evacuate the building together. To operate in practice, this requires an effective system to alert all residents to the need to evacuate. It may also be that simultaneous evacuation is impracticable for certain residents, for example those with mobility issues or certain disabilities. Simultaneous evacuation is sometimes advocated where there are doubts over construction, particularly fire separation. At Grenfell, according to the inquiry report, work done on the lifts in 2005 and 2012-16 left them unfit for evacuating vulnerable residents and aiding the emergency response.

At this present time, the National Fire Chiefs Council’s position on the ‘stay put’ policy remains the same. However, they do state that, “The advice provided to tenants can and does change depending on the circumstances that present themselves at what are very dynamic incidents.”

After the Grenfell fire, the United Nations and the World Bank-backed International Fire Safety Standards (IFSS) Coalition was set up to develop a global standard for fire safety in buildings. Following intensive work to bring public confidence around the regulation and control of fire safety measures, they launched the International Fire Safety Standard Common Principles (IFSS-CP).

Whilst standards are important, whether global or local, if they are not enforced, they are almost worthless. Fire safety inspections serve as a proactive measure to protect lives and property. By identifying potential hazards, outdated equipment, and fire code violations, inspections can prevent disasters before they happen.

The Station Nightclub Fire (USA, 2003)

On 20 February 2003 fire destroyed The Station nightclub in West Warwick, Rhode Island, USA. The blaze began when the band Jack Russell’s Great White took the stage and their tour manager set off four large fireworks. On the night of the fire, more than 462 people were attending the concert in the club, even though the club’s maximum licensed capacity was cited as 404.

The use of pyrotechnics ignited polyurethane foam that was on the walls and ceiling of the performance platform and the drummer’s alcove. The flames spread rapidly, and the drummer’s alcove reached flashover within 60 seconds after ignition. Within 90 seconds after ignition, smoke had spread along the ceiling and banked down closely to the floor trapping many people inside. During this time, the evacuation of the building turned to chaos as the majority of the attendees attempted to escape through the front door, where they had entered, which caused congestion that led to injuries and deaths. People stampeded into the area through entrances from the bar and club. In the panic to get out, many fell and were trampled. Falling people jammed the main exit, trapping the people behind them inside. One hundred people were killed either in the fire or as a result of their injuries, and more than 200 people were injured. It became the USA’s fourth deadliest nightclub fire.

Direct contributors to the substantial loss of life and injury in The Station nightclub fire included:

• Hazardous mix of building material contents including non-fire retarded foam.
• Inadequate capability to suppress the fire during its early stage of growth – sprinklers were not installed in The Station nightclub.
• Overcrowding, as there were too many people in the club at the time and all of them were trying to escape at the same time.
• Inability of exits to handle the evacuation of all of the attendees in the short time available for such a fast growing fire. Although there were four possible exits out of the club, many of the attendees were only aware of one, the main exit.

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) launched an investigation into the nightclub fire. It recommended specific improvements to building standards, codes and practices to improve the structural fire safety of buildings and evacuation procedures.

Key Lessons

In the case of The Station nightclub, not only was the legal limit of attendees for the size of the premises exceeded, but inadequate and poorly marked exits contributed significantly to the high death toll. Following the fire, US laws were passed to ensure that public venues have enough clearly marked, accessible exits.

In the UK, provisions are in place to ensure the safe and orderly movement of people during an emergency. This includes:

• Signage and Markings – Fire exit doors must be clearly marked with appropriate signage, such as ‘Fire Exit’ or ‘Emergency Exit’, to ensure they are easily identifiable. These signs should be visible and legible from a distance.
• Accessibility – Fire exit doors must be easily accessible and kept clear of any obstructions at all times. They should be unobstructed by furniture, equipment, or other objects that may hinder escape.
• Opening Mechanisms – Fire exit doors should be designed to open easily and quickly in the direction of escape. They should not require a key to unlock from the inside and should have panic bars or push bars that allow for swift and effortless opening. They can be left open as long as they are not being used as a specific fire door.
• Maintenance and Inspections – Regular maintenance and inspections of fire exit doors are essential to ensure their proper functioning. This includes checking the integrity of the door, hinges, locks and panic bars. Any defects or issues should be promptly addressed and repaired.
• Evacuation Plan – Businesses are required to have an evacuation plan as well as their fire risk assessment in place that includes clear instructions on the use of fire exit doors and the designated evacuation routes. Employees should be trained on emergency procedures and familiar with the location of fire exit doors.
• Compliance with Building Regulations – Fire exit doors must comply with relevant building regulations, such as the Building Regulations 2010 and the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005. These regulations provide detailed requirements for fire safety measures in buildings.

When these safety protocols and features are overlooked or contravened, it can have a drastic impact on the efficiency of egress response during events such as fire or other related emergencies. In general, the occupant load is determined by utilising factors that are based on how the space is used or is determined as using the maximum probable population of the space under consideration, whichever is greater. The Event Safety Guide (The Purple Guide), is the event industry standard on entertainment, primarily music led, which focuses on the application of the Health and Safety at Work etc (HASAW) Act 1974 and supporting regulations in relation to events.

The International Codes Council (ICC) responded to the findings of the inquiry into The Station nightclub fire by changing the threshold for mandatory sprinklers in Group A-2 occupancies from 300 occupants to 100 occupants. The approach emphasised the value of fire sprinklers as backup protection for cases where other safety controls fail. In the UK, automatic fire sprinkler systems have been identified as an essential active fire protection measure and research conducted by the National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) identified that sprinklers worked as intended in 94% of fire incidents in both residential and non-residential buildings and controlled or extinguished fires in 99% of cases.

Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire (USA, 1911)

There was a major fire incident at the Triangle Shirtwaist Company factory in New York City, USA on 25 March 1911, killing 146 workers. Fire rapidly spread through the cramped garment factory on the 8th, 9th and 10th floors of the Asch Building in lower Manhattan.

The fire started on the eighth floor of the Asch Building when sparks from a discarded match or cigarette ignited a scrap bin filled with fabric cuttings. Within five minutes, the eighth floor was engulfed, and although workers managed to warn employees on the tenth floor, they had no way to reach those on the ninth and there was no fire alarm system that they could trigger.

Workers on the ninth floor did not know the fire had started until it arrived, and by then there were few options left for escape, the building had only one fire escape, which collapsed during the rescue effort. Some had tried to use one of the staircases, only to find that the door was locked, a method that managers used to keep workers from taking unauthorised breaks. Panicked workers were crushed as they struggled with doors that were locked; however, a few people did manage to make it to the roof or the elevator and safety, whilst many others, with no other way to escape the flames, jumped or fell from the windows to the street, a hundred feet below. Outside, firefighters’ ladders were too short to reach the top floors and ineffective safety nets ripped like paper.

Working conditions in factories in particular at the beginning of the 20th century, were often harsh. Hours were long, typically ten to twelve hours a day, and working practices were frequently unsafe. At the Triangle Shirtwaist factory the workspace was overcrowded, and the workers were packed into tight spaces, with long tables and heavy equipment, which hindered evacuation during the fire. Poor ventilation, highly inflammable materials and the chaotic layout contributed to the rapid spread of the fire.

The catastrophe sent shockwaves through the city, beginning in the communities of immigrant workers on Manhattan’s Lower East Side, whose family members, predominately women, were victims of the fire. The fire forced a reckoning over building codes and workplace safety in New York and elsewhere. A fire drill had never been conducted there, and although innovations such as fire stairs and sprinklers were available, the Asch Building did not have them, nor did most other factories. In the wake of the fire, New York City and State created commissions to investigate factory conditions and public safety.

The Triangle Shirtwaist factory fire remained the deadliest workplace tragedy in New York City’s history until the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, 90 years later.

Key Lessons

The fire was a turning point in the American labour movement, leading to stronger labour laws that protected workers’ rights. It prompted the formation of organisations such as the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union (ILGWU) and led to the implementation of labour reforms, such as maximum working hours, minimum wage laws, and the right to organise and join a trade union. The New York State Legislature created the Factory Investigating Commission to examine factory conditions and recommend changes. The fire demonstrated the importance of emergency preparedness, leading to laws requiring regular fire drills in factories and schools.

The impact of the Triangle Shirtwaist factory fire reverberated across the world, and was widely reported in the UK, where it influenced labour reforms, fire safety awareness, and the broader worker rights movement. The fire served as a warning to the UK textile industry, which faced comparable safety risks at that time, with overcrowded workspaces, inadequate exits, and a lack of fire safety measures. As a consequence, the UK strengthened its own fire regulations and made fire safety a higher priority in industrial and public buildings, especially those with large numbers of workers or visitors. The British Suffragette movement, which was already advocating for women’s rights, saw the tragedy as a rallying point for improving the treatment of women in the workplace, and trade unions, particularly those representing garment workers, factory workers, and women workers, increased their efforts to organise workers and push for improved safety standards, better wages, and shorter working hours.

Notre Dame Cathedral Fire (France, 2019)

In 2019 fire almost destroyed Notre Dame Cathedral, in Paris. The Cathedral was built in the 12th century, with the first stone being laid in 1163. Modifications to the building were made in the 18^th century, and during the 19^th and 20^th centuries various renovations and repairs were made to the building. In 1991, UNESCO designated the Cathedral as a World Heritage site. In 2018, the building was the most visited tourist site in France, with approximately 13 million visitors per year, averaging 30,000 visitors per day.

The fire broke out in the attic of Notre Dame Cathedral on 15 April 2019 at around 6:18 pm, and because of the centuries-old wooden beams and framework, the fire spread rapidly, igniting the Cathedral’s iconic 305-feet spire which collapsed in front of shocked onlookers and the fire also destroyed the Cathedral’s roof. Although many treasured artefacts were also destroyed, many others were saved, including the Holy Crown of Thorns, a wreath of thorns believed to have been placed on Jesus Christ’s head during his crucifixion. Notre Dame’s famed bell towers, the grand organ, and the rose windows also survived the fire.

Early on, prosecutors suggested that the blaze could have originated with an electrical malfunction, a carelessly discarded cigarette or something else related to the renovation work that had been underway at the time. However, five years of investigation and expert reports have failed to identify the precise cause, and no charges have been filed against anyone. The Cathedral is scheduled to reopen at a ceremony on Saturday, 7 December 2024.

The fire that almost destroyed Notre Dame Cathedral also revealed a serious health risk. When the flames melted the roof, tons of toxic lead dust were released into the air and settled across Paris. It took four months for the city to complete a deep-clean operation of the pavements and boulevards even as tourists, residents and traders walked the streets around the Cathedral daily. It has been widely documented that lead can be toxic, even in small doses. “There is no level of exposure to lead that is known to be without harmful effects,” the World Health Organization (WHO) reports in its lead poisoning fact sheet.

Key Lessons

Fire is probably the most devastating of disasters that can strike a historic building. As well as the damage caused by heat and smoke, the water used to extinguish the blaze can also cause serious issues and damage.

Historic buildings are very different to modern buildings and pose unique fire risks and limitations associated with them, for example old doors, hidden voids, and poor compartmentalisation. Due to the construction of these old buildings, a small fire can escalate very quickly and spread through hidden voids and cavities, frequently accelerated by features such as wood panelling, or as in the case of Notre Dame, the wooden framework inside the north tower.

All fire safety measures in historic buildings not only need to protect human life, but they also need to support the long-term survival of the historic building and to be able to preserve treasure and artefacts contained in the building. The installation of state-of-the-art fire detection systems can help to immediately alert authorities of the exact location of a fire in a building; at Notre Dame there was a 15-minute delay between the first and second fire alarm which enabled the fire to take hold, taking firefighters over 9 hours to get it under control. 

Historic England offers advice and resources to help risk assess and develop a fire strategy appropriate to the individual site.

Common Themes and Lessons from These Incidents

There is a saying “prevention is better than cure”. In the case of fire, by using effective fire protection methods such as fire-resistant building materials, you can help to prevent or slow a fire down. As we have seen in the case studies above, the use of improper building materials such as the external cladding used in many high-rise buildings including Grenfell Tower, which was made of flammable materials, and the inappropriate insulation behind the cladding contributed to the fire’s rapid spread. 

In the UK, fire safety regulations play an essential part in ensuring the protection of life, property, and the safety of firefighters. The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 is a key legislation that places responsibilities on individuals with control over premises to assess and manage fire risks. In addition, the Building Regulations Part B specifically addresses fire safety requirements in buildings. However, compliance with these regulations is crucial to ensure the safety of buildings, especially high-rise structures.

If a fire cannot be prevented, then ensuring the safe and efficient evacuation of everyone on the premises is paramount. Fire escape routes should be carefully planned out. A fire escape route is a designated pathway or series of pathways within a building that provides a safe and quick means of evacuation in the event of a fire, or other emergency, so that occupants can reach a place of safety. They should be well signposted, and designed to be easily accessible, well lit and free from obstruction. How many fire exits a building requires depends on its size, occupancy and layout; typically, buildings are recommended to have multiple fire exits strategically located throughout the premises, and all exits should have separate escape routes to minimise the risk of a blockage and ensure a more orderly evacuation. Fire escapes and exits for all buildings in the UK are governed by the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005.

Regular fire drills will help monitor the performance and the effectiveness of fire safety measures. Fire drills are an essential aspect of fire safety as they help to prepare people for potential emergencies. In a real-life situation, panic and confusion can take hold, making it difficult to evacuate the building safely, which was highlighted in both The Station nightclub and the Triangle Shirtwaist factory fires detailed above. However, fire safety training and regular fire drills can help to mitigate these risks and can help identify potential weaknesses or areas that need improvement, such as outdated fire alarms or blocked exits.

A Fire Emergency Evacuation Plan is a written document which includes the action to be taken in the event of fire and the arrangements for calling the fire brigade. However, it needs to become more flexible and responsive to the specific circumstances of a fire. This need was highlighted in the case of Grenfell Tower when the ‘stay put’ policy was not rescinded in sufficient time.

A fire should be detected quickly and a warning given so that people can escape safely. Early fire detection is crucial for preventing catastrophic outcomes such as those detailed in the case studies above. Early discovery and warning will increase the time available for escape and enable people to evacuate safely before the fire takes hold and blocks escape routes or makes escape difficult. The nature and extent of the fire detection and warning arrangements will need to satisfy the requirements indicated by the fire risk assessment. In all instances the detector type chosen should be appropriate for the premises to be protected. For example, a heat detector may function better than a smoke detector in a fume-laden or dusty environment but may not be appropriate for the rest of the protected premises.

In places where fire could develop for some time before being discovered, it is important to protect vital escape routes, particularly staircases, with fire-resisting construction which may include fire-resisting doors. Fire sprinkler systems are designed to detect and combat fires at their earliest stages. Each sprinkler head is equipped with a heat-sensitive element that responds only to the temperature of its immediate vicinity. When a fire ignites, the air directly above it heats rapidly, causing the sprinkler head closest to the flames to activate. Fire sprinklers react swiftly to fires, often extinguishing them before they escalate into uncontrollable infernos. By containing the fire’s spread, sprinklers prevent extensive property damage and they create a safer environment for people to evacuate, ensuring that escape paths are less obstructed by flames and smoke.

In many of the case studies we have examined, fire safety codes had not been complied with and many of the subsequent inquiries into the incidents noted that non-compliance played a major part in the severity of the incidents. For example, the Grenfell Inquiry report has concluded that “Grenfell Tower was plagued by a ‘culture of non-compliance’ with fire safety and building regulations”.

The Fire and Rescue Service can visit premises unannounced at any time to carry out inspections, although they generally make appointments. During these types of visits the Fire Safety Inspecting Officer will ensure the rules are being followed and that employees and members of the public are kept safe. Audits are carried out following nationally agreed guidelines so that any advice given is consistent and proportionate to any risk in the specific premises.

Applying the Lessons

If you are responsible for a business or public space environment, here are specific areas of fire safety you need to really pay attention to, including:

• Conducting regular fire risk assessments and making an emergency plan, updating safety protocols as required
• Ensuring that buildings have clear evacuation routes and exit signs
• Having fire doors regularly maintained, and not allowing staff to wedge them open, even on hot days
• Installing and maintaining appropriate fire detection and suppression systems
• Ensuring the electrical system is regularly tested, at least once every year
• Making sure that fire safety training and fire drills are carried out regularly

In the home, we can all learn lessons from these major fire incidents and apply that learning to enhance the safety of our homes, including:

• Creating a fire escape plan and regularly practising it; the Fire Brigade offer advice and resources to help you do this
• Investing in fire-rated materials such as fire-resistant glass for windows, fire-retardant furnishings etc.
• Installing heat and smoke detectors – fit them in any room where a fire can start and check them regularly
• Installing fire extinguishers, particularly in the kitchen
• Before going to bed, it is really important to make some simple checks such as turning off and unplugging electrical appliances, hob and oven switches are all off, mobile phones, tablets or e-cigarettes are not left charging overnight

Conclusion

Learning from past experiences is crucial for decision-making, and for avoiding mistakes. We can all learn a lot from the past, and from the experiences of others, as the case studies that we have examined show us. It allows us to develop strategies for dealing with challenges such as fire safety. The key is to take the learning and apply it to anticipate and prevent incidents from happening in the future. However, unfortunately this is not always the case as the following incident shows us.

At around 5.30 pm on 22 February 2024, a fire broke out on the 8th floor of a high-rise building in Valencia, Spain. The flames, propelled by a strong wind, spread quickly. Within 15 minutes, they reached the top of the 14-storey property. In two hours flames engulfed the building killing ten people, with 15 people treated for injuries. The main cause of the fire spreading was the external cladding made from aluminium sheets bonded to a central polyethylene core. Unfortunately, many lessons from Grenfell have still not been learnt.